This paper studies optimal divestment policy of an investor in a …rm that may partially and gradually divest its capital or sell the whole …rm at once. Partial divestment o¤ers greater ‡exibility while a whole-…rm transaction provides a price premium. We show that, if the price premium includes both a …xed and a proportional component, a large …rm optimally starts to divest partial capital before choosing to sell the whole-…rm. Full-…rm divestment is preferable over partial divestment with higher pro…t volatility, in more declining markets and if capital is less industry-speci…c.
Introduction
Firms can downgrade their operations and release the capital to investors in response to unfavorable market conditions or a deterioration of e¢ ciency relative to competitors. In essence, corporate assets can be either divested and sold gradually over time or the whole …rm can be sold at once. These two alternative phase-out modes di¤er in two key aspects.
On the one hand, gradual divestment allows …rms to maintain ‡exibility and to bene…t from possible future positive market developments. In this respect gradual divestment is advantageous compared to …rm sale. On the other hand, partial displaced assets are sold with a discount on secondary markets whereas …rms are sold with a substantial takeover premium. In this paper we study optimal divestment directly addressing the trade-o¤ between the ‡exibility of gradual divestment and the premium of whole …rm sale.
The ‡exibility advantage of gradual divestment is related to the optionality of the irreversible (dis-)investment decisions. The real options approach to investment stresses the value created by uncertainty when investment timing is ‡exible. In the case of Finance Group, Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, PO Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, the Netherlands; Tel.: +31 (0)10 4081435; E-mail: gryglewicz@few.eur.nl. gradual divestment, the …rm holds a bundle of options to sell its partial assets. A marginal sale of assets leaves the options to sell the remaining assets and allows the …rm to bene…t from their optimal execution in the future. In the case of …rm sale, the decision is also an option at owners discretion. The available evidence on takeover transactions supports the stance we adopt in this paper. Andrade, Mitchell and Sta¤ord (2001) show that 94 percent of takeover transactions are initiated by the selling party. 1 While the timing of …rm sales is ‡exible, all ‡exibility is lost after the …rm sale and exit.
If the whole …rm is sold at the same price as the sum of partial asset sales, gradual divestment is always a preferable choice. This is no longer the case if partial asset sale is associated with a discount in comparison to whole …rm sale. The literature on asset sale provides strong empirical evidence for the partial asset sale discount and the …rm sale premium. The discount for partial displaced capital stems from …rm and sectorial capital speci…city, the thinness of the used capital market and costs of redeploying the capital. For example, Ramey and Shapiro (2001) cite such reasons for substantially discounted prices of used capital relative to replacement value found in the aerospace industry. Pulvino (1998) shows that …nancial constraints add to depress selling prices for used aircraft in transactions between airlines. Firm sales, on the other hand, are attributed with premiums relative to some benchmark values. The two main sources of the premium are the following. First, a …rm is sold with a premium over the selling price of partial physical capital because many types of intangible assets are purchased only with the full corporate entity. These assets include mainly competitive intangibles such as customer and suppliers relations, know-how and organization, and may account to a signi…cant portion of …rm value (see, e.g., Hand and Lev (2003) ). Second, persistent empirical evidence documents substantial takeover premiums de…ned as the di¤erence between the selling price and the value of the target …rm before the transaction. A recent study of Boone and Mulherin (2007) reports a mean premium of 40 percent in the announced transaction price relative to the price of the target …rm 4 weeks before the …rst announcement of the takeover. This means that even after controlling for intangible assets (included in the pre-announcement …rm value), whole …rms are sold with premiums. These takeover premiums are typically explained as originating from strategic synergies or higher productivity of the buying …rm coupled with bargaining power of the selling party. Part of the surplus created by a merger is paid out to the target …rm owners.
1 Using a smaller sample, but with more detailed information, Boone and Mulherin (2007) document that 15 percent of takeover bids are unsolicited. However small is the fraction of unsolicited takeover bids, even these sale transactions leave some ‡exibility and discretion in the hands of the selling party. Boone and Mulherin (2007) report that most of the unsolicited bids are executed by competitive auctions to solicit bids from other potential buyers. Furthermore, Schwert (2000) shows that the so-called hostile takeover deals are economically equivalent to friendly takeovers and hostility is mostly related to strategic negotiations.
Given the above characteristics of corporate divestments, some interesting questions remain unanswered. What does the optimal downsizing path look like? How does the structure of the price discount-premium a¤ect the choice between partial divestment and …rm sale? Should …rms with more volatile pro…ts divest partially or sell at once? Do …rms in more declining markets prefer gradual divestment or …rm sale? Do …rms with more industry-speci…c capital opt for gradual exit or takeover sale?
To answer these questions we construct a stylized real options model in which a …rm faces a stochastic pro…t ‡ow and optimally chooses its divestment path. Marginal units of capital may be released and sold at a discounted unit price. Alternatively, the whole …rm can be sold at a premium price that depends on the capital level at the transaction time. To focus on the main trade-o¤ problem between partial divestment and …rm sale we assume that both decisions are irreversible. From a technical point of view, the problem is not trivial as it involves two di¤erent stochastic control technics. Partial divestment is modeled as a barrier control, and the …rm adjusts capital level at each time the underlying pro…tability state variable reaches a new minimum on a barrier. On the other hand, whole-…rm sale is a discrete decision, and the …rm's problem takes the form of an optimal stopping problem. 2 Our analysis indicates that the optimal divestment policy depends critically on the structure of the discount-premium of the capital price. We …rst study the simplest case, in which the …rm-sale premium is linear (proportional in the level of capital). In this case, the optimal policy is either to divest only gradually if the proportional premium is below a certain threshold or to divest the whole …rm if the proportional premium is su¢ ciently large (it is assumed here that the …rm has followed the optimal divestment path before and does not start o¤ the optimal policy path).
The optimal divestment policy takes a notably di¤erent form if the …rm-sale premium is a¢ ne, i.e. if the premium consists of both proportional and …xed components. The …xed part of the premium arises because of, e.g., non-tangible assets sold only with the whole …rm. In this case, if the proportional premium is su¢ ciently large, the …rm optimally decides to use only the …rm-sale option, as the premium o¤sets the gains from the ‡exibility of gradual divestment. But if the proportional premium is not too high, the …rm optimally divests marginal units of capital in a declining market until its size reaches a certain threshold. Subsequently, the remaining capital is sold with the whole …rm, but this only happens after an anticipation phase in which the market falls to a su¢ ciently low level. Intuitively, while at high levels of capital the …rm prefers to maintain the ‡exibility of partial divestment against a moderate …rm-sale premium, at 2 Two other recent papers study corporate investment as mixed stochastic control problems. Guo and Pham (2005) analyze optimal entry and subsequent investment, and Décamps and Villeneuve (2007) deal with dividend choice and optimal exercise of a growth option of a …nancially constrained …rm. lower levels of capital the bene…t of a positive …xed premium will o¤set the ‡exibility advantage of gradual adjustments.
The model generates some new predictions on the optimal choice of divestment policy and, speci…cally, on the choice between partial divestment and …rm sale. We …nd that in more uncertain markets the value-maximizing …rm is more inclined to divest its capital fully at once. This means that, somewhat surprisingly, the value of ‡exibility of partial divestment does not become more valuable in more volatile markets compared to onetime …rm sale. This e¤ect arises because …rm sale, being less ‡exible, has a higher value of waiting, which is directly and positively a¤ected by uncertainty. We also show that …rm sale is more preferable over partial divestment in more declining markets. This is because in a declining market there is less room to bene…t from the ‡exibility of gradual divestment.
We extend the model to allow the selling price of capital to be correlated with the market state variable. The correlation coe¢ cient between the market state and the price level is interpreted as a measure of industry-speci…city of capital. We model in a reduced form the e¤ect that, in a declining market, the demand for used capital decreases, and consequently prices also fall. We are interested how the industry-speci…city of capital a¤ects optimal divestment policies. We obtain that the more industry-speci…c is capital, the more preferable is partial divestment over …rm sale. The explanation for this result is again related to the large value of waiting in the option to sell the …rm at once.
Because the speci…city of capital a¤ect the values of alternative strategies mostly via the values of waiting, and increasing speci…city decreases these values, …rm sale becomes less desirable.
The distinction between incremental capital adjustment and full-…rm sale has been noted by several previous authors. In a series of two papers Nalebu¤ (1985, 1990 ) study divestment and exit in declining industries. Ghemawat and Nalebu¤ (1985) consider the equilibrium order of full-…rm exit in an oligopolistic market, while Ghemawat and Nalebu¤ (1990) allows …rms to adjust their capital incrementally. In contrast, our paper incorporates both modes of capital adjustment in one model with uncertain demand, but we choose not to focus on the competitive e¤ects. Lieberman (1990) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) empirically study the choice between partial and whole-…rm divestment. While these studies do not test the whole set of predictions implied by our model, they nevertheless provide some supporting evidence. In particular, Lieberman (1990) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) show that large …rms adjust capital partially and small …rms tend to sell their all assets at once.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up a model of a …rm with both partial and full-…rm divestments. Section 3 derives the optimal divestment policies and the corresponding …rm values. Section 4 discusses the implications of the model for divestment policies. Section 5 studies the e¤ects of industry-speci…city of capital. Section 6 concludes and the Appendix provides the proofs omitted in the main text.
Model
Consider a …rm that produces a uniform non-storable good and faces stochastic demand.
To produce the good the …rm uses capital and possibly other variable inputs. The …rm's operating pro…t at time t depends on the installed capital stock K t and the market conditions variable X t and is given by
The formulation has been frequently employed in previous studies (Bertola and Caballero (1994) , Abel and Eberly (1996) , Abel and Eberly (1999) , Guo, Miao and Morellec (2005) ) and is consistent with either a monopolist facing an isoelastic demand function and production technology with non-increasing returns to scale, or a price taking …rm with decreasing returns to scale technology. 3 The investors are risk neutral and discount cash ‡ows at a constant rate r.
The market conditions variable X t captures the exogenous time varying business environment; more speci…cally X t re ‡ects demand shocks, but can also include productivity shocks and the prices of variable inputs (see footnote 3). We assume that the process (X t ) t 0 evolves according to the geometric Brownian motion
where Z t is the standard Brownian motion, is the drift parameter and > 0 is the volatility parameter. We denote the …ltration (the -algebra) generated by (X t ) t 0 with (F t ) t 0 . To ensure convergence of the problem, it is assumed that < r.
Marginal units of capital can be sold at a price normalized to 1. Selling the whole …rm at once results in a premium with a …xed component A 0 and a unit price 3 Suppose that the production function is Qt = K t , where Qt is output produced at time t and 2 (0; 1] measures the degree of returns to scale. The inverse demand function is given by Pt = XtQ 1 " t , so that for a given quantity the price evolves in time together with the demand shock Xt. " > 1 is the constant price elasticity of demand. Then instantaneous operating pro…t at time t is
De…ning = =" we obtain (1) with 2 (0; 1) if either the …rm has a monopoly power (that is if " < 1) or the technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale ( 2 (0; 1)). As shown by Abel and Eberly (2004) the argument can be extended to the case with variable outputs in the production function (e.g. labor) and time varying productivity.
of capital equal to a 1. 4 This means that the owners of the …rm with a level of capital k divesting at once receive ak + A. The …xed premium may stem from the nontangible assets or from a part of the takeover premium. It must be understood that our formulation incorporates the discount for partial displaced capital in the di¤erence between a and 1, so the normalization of the selling price of partial capital is without loss of generality. Capital divestment, either marginal or complete exit, is irreversible.
The objective of the …rm is to maximize the value of the original owners. The control policy comprises the choice of capital and the exit time. The admissible capital contraction is a non-increasing process K = (K t ) t 0 that is progressively measurable with respect to …ltration (F t ) t 0 . The exit time is a stopping time with respect to (F t ) t 0 . The value of the …rm following the optimal investment policy is the solution to the following optimization problem:
The …rm's problem involves two stochastic control problems, i.e. instantaneous control over a divestment path fK t+s g and optimal stopping at a stopping time .
3 Optimal Divestment Policy
Benchmark Cases and Linear Premium
In this subsection we consider two limit cases. In the …rst case, the …rm has only gradual divestment available. In the second case, the …rm can only downsize by …rm sale. Both cases are straightforward simpli…cations of the more general optimization problem (2).
This analysis is then used to study the case where both divestment modes are available and the …rm-sale premium is linear in capital, i.e. a 1 and A = 0.
Denote by V m (x; k) the value of the …rm that follows optimal divestment policy in the case the …rm can only sell partial capital. The optimal policy is characterized by a barrier function X m (k) that, for a given k, triggers in…nitesimal divestment (see Pindyck (1988) , Abel and Eberly (1996) ). The standard arguments lead to the following Bellman equation that must be satis…ed by V m :
The equation states that the required rate of return (the left-hand side) must be equal to the expected gain in …rm value plus pro…t ‡ow (x; k) (the right-hand side).
The divestment trigger X m (k) and the value V m can be obtained by solving the di¤erential equation (3) subject to appropriate boundary conditions. At the divestment trigger the …rm sells the in…nitesimal capital dk for a price of 1 per unit. It must hold
Writing this in derivative form, we obtain the smooth-pasting condition
The condition requires that the marginal value of capital at the optimal divestment barrier X m (k) must be equal to its selling price.
The optimality condition for X m (k) requires that the slopes of the value function are equal at X m (k). The requirement in derivative form is known as the high-contact condition (see Dumas (1991) ) and is written as
Finally, we also require that, as the demand shift increases to in…nity, the option value to divest remains …nite. This means that 5
In the second extreme case, the …rm has only the option to phase out by …rm sale.
Denote by V e (x; k) the value function of the …rm following an optimal …rm sale policy at trigger X e (k). Given that the values in both cases are driven by the same stochastic process and the same payo¤ function, it is clear that before exit, V e must satisfy the same type of Bellman equation as before:
In order to obtain the …rm value and the optimal trigger strategy, we need to solve (7) subject to the appropriate boundary conditions. When the trigger X e (k) is reached, the …rm sells k units of capital for unit price a and obtains a non-negative …xed premium
A. The value function must be equal to the proceeds from sale, which means that the value-matching condition is
The …rm maximizes its value by choosing the optimal X e (k) and this requires that the slopes of the value function are equal at the sale trigger. This translates into the smooth-pasting condition at X e (k):
In addition, the value function should be …nite as X raises to in…nity, so that the …rm-sale option remains …nite:
Using the above analysis, we prove the …rst result of the mixed case where both gradual divestment and …rm sale are available, and the …rm sells at a proportional premium. Before we state the result, let us de…ne a by a = 1 1 (1 )
Proposition 1 Suppose that a 1, A = 0 and (X 0 ; K 0 ) is at or above the relevant triggers characterized below.
(a) If a < a , the …rm divests only via partial divestment at
and the …rm value is
where
(b) If a a ; then the …rm sale trigger is given by
The proposition characterizes the optimal divestment triggers and the …rm values in two cases. When the proportional premium is su¢ ciently large, a a , the whole …rm is sold at once as soon as the market shock reaches X e (K 0 ). If a < a , the …rm divests only gradually following the barrier control at X m (k). Figure 1 presents the optimal divestment policies in the two cases. The reason for this dichotomous outcome is that the proportionality of payo¤s in the two alternative divestment modes translates into the proportionality of the value function. If the premium is su¢ ciently small, then ‡exibility of partial divestment always o¤sets the premium of …rm sale. If a is su¢ ciently large, then the premium counterbalances the ‡exibility advantage of partial divestment at all levels of capital. 6
Divestment with Non-linear Firm-sale Premium
In this section we consider a more general case of …rm-sale premium and allow it to be a¢ ne in the level of capital. In other words, we assume that a 1 and A > 0. The previous section shows that with A = 0, a a implies that V e (x; k) V m (x; k) and the …rm is better o¤ selling the whole entity. As we show next, this conveys to the a¢ ne case, but if a < a , it needs no longer be true that V e (x; k) < V m (x; k) for all levels of capital.
Lemma 2 Suppose that a 1 and A > 0. If a a , then V e (x; k) V m (x; k). If a < a , then there exists a level of capitalk that separates two regimes: V e (x; k) V m (x; k) for k k ; and V e (x; k) > V m (x; k) for k <k.
In the a¢ ne case, V e (x; k) exceeds V m (x; k) for su¢ ciently low k. The intuition is that at small levels of capital the bene…t of achieving a positive …xed premium will 6 The results and the conclusions presented here depend on the assumption that (X0; K0) is at or above the relevant triggers. The case is economically the most interesting. For the starting value to fall below the triggers, the …rm must have deviated for some unmodeled reasons from the optimal policy before the initial date. Nevertheless, if a < a and X0 X m (K0) (in other words, the …rm starts "too large" for a given market), the analysis resembles the model of Décamps, Mariotti and Villeneuve (2006) that studies an investment decision in one of two alternative projects. For a given x, there is a level of capital at which the …rm is indi¤erent between partial divestment and whole-…rm sale. Intuitively, if the …rm has a high level of capital for the current (low) state of the market, it is better o¤ selling all the capital with a premium than making a large partial adjustment at discounted prices and stay at the low market. If x falls below this indi¤erence point, …rm sale is preferable, if x rises, the value of partial divestment will exceed the value of …rm sale. As in Décamps et al. (2006) , it is possible to show that at the point of indi¤erence the …rm optimally does not make an divestment decision, and instead prefers to wait for the development of the market to decide for either partial adjustment, if x increases su¢ ciently, or …rm sale, if x falls su¢ ciently and the market becomes unattractive for partial adjustment. The bottom line is that there is an inaction region at low levels of x for a given k, in which the …rm does not make divestment decisions, but divest the whole …rm if the market deteriorates and divests partially if the market improves. o¤set the ‡exibility advantage of partial divestment. However, the inequality V e (x; k) > V m (x; k) is only a necessary condition for whole-…rm sale. Even if V e (x; k) > V m (x; k) holds, the …rm may still be better o¤ selling some capital by partial divestment before selling the remaining capital at once. This will be the case as long as the marginal value of partial divestment exceeds the marginal value of capital sold with the whole …rm.
These arguments suggest that in the case of a < a , optimal divestment will take the form of a two-stage policy. If the capital level is relatively large, such that it exceeds a certain threshold on capital K , the …rm will optimally divest partially. Below K , investors will be better o¤ selling the whole …rm. The aim of the remainder of this section is to characterize this policy and the corresponding …rm value.
As before, it is standard to show that the value function W (x; k) satis…es the following Bellman equation:
The optimal solution to the optimization problem (2) can be characterized using the di¤erential equation (11) and the appropriate boundary conditions. As long as k > K , the marginal value of capital at the optimal divestment barrier X m (k) must be equal to its selling price. This means that the following holds
The optimality condition for X m (k) requires the high-contact condition:
When the …rm switches from the marginal divestment mode to the …rm sale mode we require that the marginal values of capital from the respective policies are equal.
Speci…cally, it must hold that
If the equality did not hold at K , the …rm would increase its value by choosing another point to switch from partial to whole-…rm divestment. The optimal …rm sale is triggered at X e (k) and the value must satisfy the value matching condition:
The condition means that the …rm value must be equal to the proceeds from the sale.
The optimality of the endogenous trigger requires that the value function is di¤erentiable at the trigger, which leads to the smooth pasting condition:
Before we characterize the solution of the divestment problem (2), let us de…ne
Suppose A > 0 and a < a , and let K be the unique k
Proposition 3 Suppose A > 0 and (X 0 ; K 0 ) is at or above the relevant triggers characterized below. The optimal divestment policy is characterized by the marginal divestment barrier
and the …rm sale trigger is
Figure 2: Divestment triggers with a¢ ne …rm-sale premium (A > 0) and a < a . The …rm divests partially following the barrier control at X m (k) as long as k > K . If k K the …rm divests the remaining capital at trigger X e (k).
The …rm value is given by
and is as characterized in Proposition 1.
Analysis and Implications
Proposition 3 characterizes the optimal divestment path. The optimal policy is illustrated in Figure 2 and can be described as follows. The …rm divests marginally if the capital level is relatively high, above K , and whenever x reaches the divestment barrier X m (k). As soon as capital reaches K , the …rm stops partial divestment. This is con…rmed by Proposition 3, which states that partial divestment stops at X m (K ) and …rm sale is triggered by X e (K ). As in general X m (K ) will exceed X e (K ), the optimal divestment path is characterized by an anticipation region, in which the …rm does not divest marginally. Instead it waits until a su¢ ciently negative pro…tability shock occurs.
This triggers …rm sale and exit. plants.
An interesting special case is a premium with only the …xed component A > 0 and no proportional one, that is a = 1. In this case, K can be characterized explicitly by
The …rm size at which the …rm is sold is increasing in the …xed premium A and in the level of returns to scale . The case of a = 1 is also special because the anticipation region X m (K ) X e (K ) disappears and the …rm continuously moves from partial divestment to full-…rm sale.
We are interested in the impact of parameters characterizing the …rm and its environment on the choice between partial divestment and …rm sale. We …rst consider the e¤ects of uncertainty represented by the volatility parameter in the X t process.
Proposition 4 a decreases in . K increases in if a 2 (1; a ).
The proposition states that the e¤ect of uncertainty on the preference between the ‡exibility of partial divestment and the premium of …rm sale is unequivocal. The cuto¤ level of a that makes the …rm to opt for full-…rm sale decreases in the level of uncertainty.
This means that in a more uncertain environment, the …rm prefers full-…rm sale for a larger set of parameters. This same kind of prediction is implied by the e¤ect of on K : the …rm exits with higher level of capital after some partial divestment.
These results may seem surprising at …rst. From the standard real options theory we know that higher uncertainty increases the value of waiting. One might expect that the ‡exibility advantage of partial divestment is more valuable in a more uncertain market.
We …nd the opposite and the intuition for our result is the following. Firm sale is one irreversible real option and, as such, has a substantial value created by the value of waiting. Partial gradual divestment forms a sequence of real options, and despite the fact that these marginal divestment decisions are irreversible, the whole policy is, in a sense, less irreversible than …rm sale. Hence the optimal gradual investment policy takes less into account the value of waiting and the value of the policy will be less responsive to the parameters a¤ecting the value of ‡exibility. 7 Consequently, the value of …rm sale 7 These observations are similar to Malchow-Moeller and Thorsen (2005) who constrast repeated is more responsive to the changes in uncertainty than is the value of gradual partial divestment and the former value increases more in making …rm sale more attractive.
Proposition 5 a increases in . K decreases in if a 2 (1; a ).
The result in the proposition implies that in a more declining market, the option to sell the whole …rm and exit becomes more preferable over gradual divestment. In particular, with lower , the cuto¤ premium a decreases and the size of full-…rm sale K increases. Intuitively, in a more declining market, there is less room to bene…t from the ‡exibility of gradual divestment.
Industry-speci…c Capital and Divestment
The price of capital has been …xed in the above formulation. Arguably, in a declining market the selling prices of capital are linked with the state of the market. One reason for prices changing together with market/pro…tability shocks is industry-speci…city of capital. If capital is less productive outside industry, then, after a negative industryrelated shock, demand for displaced capital falls and prices decrease. The argument is in line with the industry-equilibrium model of Shleifer and Vishny (1992) . Their paper explicitly models potential buyers of displaced capital and predicts that negative industry-speci…c shocks and …nancing constraints will result in depressed prices of used capital.
We model these e¤ects in a reduced form by linking the capital price P t with the market/productivity process X t . Speci…cally, we suppose that the evolution of X t and P t is given by
We interpret the correlation coe¢ cient as the parameter measuring the industry-speci…city of capital. A high positive means that capital is industry speci…c and a decline in X t results, on average, in a de ‡ated capital price. To ensure that the problem is well de…ned and has a …nite solution we assume that X < r and 2 X 2 X P + 2 P > 0. The extension with variable capital price adds to the complexity of the model. In order to stay in a tractable environment we assume in this section that the whole …rm sells only at a proportional premium, that is A = 0 and a 1. To summarize, a unit investment options and a single investment option. of capital divested partially at time t sells at price P t ; and the …rm holding K t units of capital sells at aP t K t .
In this setup we are interested in the impact of industry-speci…city of capital on the optimal divestment policy. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 6 The more industry-speci…c is capital (the higher is ), the more preferable is gradual partial divestment over …rm sale.
The intuition for the result is related to the value of waiting created by the divestment options. The usual prediction of the real options theory is that in an environment as in this section, the value of waiting decreases if productivity and capital price are more correlated (see, e.g., Hartman and Hendrickson (2002) ). As discussed in Section 4, the value of waiting is larger for the single option to sell the whole …rm than for the sequence of marginal options to divest partially. Thus increasing decreases the value of …rm sale more than the value of gradual divestment. To put it di¤erently, when capital is highly industry-speci…c (high ), then, after waiting for the market to deteriorate su¢ ciently to trigger full-…rm sale, the …rm will, with high probability, sell its capital at low prices.
Consequently, the …rm's preference moves towards gradual divestment.
Conclusions
The paper has studied divestment decisions and addressed directly the trade-o¤ between the ‡exibility of gradual divestment and the price premium from full-…rm sale. It provides analytical results for …rm values and optimal divestment policies under alternative premium-discount structures. In particular, if the …rm-sale premium is a¢ ne, the …rm optimally divests marginal units of capital in a declining market until its size reaches a certain threshold. Subsequently, but after an anticipation phase in which the state of market falls to a su¢ ciently low level, the remaining capital is sold with the whole …rm.
The model produces a number of novel predictions on the optimal choice of divestment policy and, speci…cally, on the choice between partial divestment and …rm sale.
We analyze the impact of displaced capital discount, …rm sale premium, …rm size, pro…t volatility, market growth and industry-speci…city of capital. Future empirical research could directly test these predictions.
Future research should also explore if the same mechanisms that are described in this paper carry over when competition and potential buyers of capital are modeled explicitly. It may be particularly interesting to study a dynamic oligopoly model of a shrinking industry in which …rms play a war of attrition as, for example, in Murto (2004) , but then to allow …rms to undertake partial divestment and takeovers.
The framework presented in the paper can be adapted to study the other side the capacity adjustment decision, namely investment. It will be interesting to consider a combination of gradual capital expansion and discrete technological change, analogously to capital downsizing and …rm sale analyzed in this paper. The problem of capital accumulation and technology investment has received considerable attention in deterministic models (see, e.g., Feichtinger, Hartl, Kort and Veliov (2006) ), but has not been addressed in the stochastic framework of real options.
A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Solving (3) subject to (4)- (6), we obtain that
and, if x X m (k),
The solution to (7) subject to (8)- (10) is
and, if x X e (k), then
Now suppose that A = 0 and x max fX e (k); X m (k)g. Using the value functions characterized above, we have that
The sign of the expression depends on the sign of the term in the square brackets. This means that if a a then V m (x; k) V e (x; k) and if a < a then V m (x; k) > V e (x; k).
In the case of a < a , the value of gradual divestment always exceeds the value of …rm sale, so it is never optimal for the …rm to choose the latter strategy. It follows that the optimal trigger policy of the …rm with both divestment strategies available is given by X m (k) and its value W is equal to the value of the …rm with marginal divestment
In the case of a a , the value of strategy comprising of only gradual divestment is always below the value of optimal …rm sale. To conclude that the …rm does not divest gradually, we still need to rule out a strategy consisting of some gradual divestment followed by …rm sale. Suppose the …rm divests a marginal unit of capital before the whole …rm is sold. The marginal value of capital that is sold optimally by partial divestment is equal to V m K (x; k) if x > X m (k) and equal to 1 if x X m (k). In the …rst case, if x > X m (k), comparing this marginal value with the marginal value of capital from …rm sale, we have that
which is non-positive because a a . In the second case, if x = X m (k), the di¤erence in marginal values is
The last inequality holds because a a : It can be easily veri…ed that for X e (k) x X m (k), V e k (X m ; k) is decreasing in x, so the di¤erence 1 V e k (x; k) remains non-positive (to see that V e k (X m ; k) is decreasing in this interval, observe that V e xk (X m (k); k) < 0 and that V e xk (x; k) is a convex function on the relevant interval). It follows that the marginal value of capital sold by the …rm sale always exceeds the marginal value of capital from partial divestment, so the maximizing …rm never chooses to divest partially.
Proof of Lemma 2. The same steps that in the proof of Proposition 1 lead to the following formula for the di¤erence between the values:
It was also shown there that 0 is equivalent to a a . It follows that a a implies that A=k for all k 0. Thus a a implies
In the case of a < a , it holds that > 0. So there existsk > 0 such that = A=k.
Proof of Proposition 3. It is straightforward to verify that (18) satis…es (11)- (13) and (15)- (16) for a given K . Note that lim k#K W K (X m (k); k) = 1. Now we consider two cases to verify (14). First, if K is such that X e (K ) > X m (K ), then the …rm is sold at X m (K ), and so lim k"K W K (X m (k); k) = a. It follows that, as long as a > 1,
which can be shown to be equivalent to k A 1 a . Applying then (14) to (18) we obtain that K must satisfy R(K ) = 0. To verify that K is unique in the case of a < a , we show that there is a unique root to
monotonically decreasing starting from a positive value. Whether R(k) has a root for
if a < a and positive if a > a . We conclude that if a < a there exists a unique …nite K such that (14) holds. If a a , the marginal value of capital sold with the whole …rm always exceeds the marginal value of capital sold partially and K = 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. We …rst consider the e¤ect on a . in ‡uences a via .
Taking the derivative of a with respect to we have that
The sign of the derivative depends on the sign of 1 ; which is a sum of a positive and negative term. We now show that 1 is always less or equal to zero. Observe that 1 increases in 0:
Moreover, lim !0 1 = 1 + log < 0 for all 2 (0; 1). Thus 1 is non-positive for all 0 and consequently da =d 0. Finally, it is straightforward to verify that d =d > 0 so da =d 0 as stated in the proposition. Now consider the derivative of K with respect to . Recall that if a 2 (1; a ), then
First, let 2 = [ (a + A=k)] and consider @R=@ :
where in the second equality we twice use substitutions implied by R(k) = 0, and the inequality follows from the observation that 2 1 log 2 for all positive 2 with equality holding only at 2 = 1. Combined with the previous observation that d =d > 0; we have that dR=d > 0. Second, consider @R=@K :
The inequality follows from the fact that a (a + A=k) 1 for k A= (1 a ).
Combining the above observations we obtain that dK =d > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof is very similar to the proof of Proposition 4. a¤ects a and K only via . The only di¤erence in comparision to the e¤ect of in Proposition 4 is that-as can be readily veri…ed-now we have that d =d < 0.
Applying this to the derivatives in the proof of Proposition 4 we obtain the result.
Proof of Proposition 6. The …rm optimization problem is now the following W (X t ; P t ; K t ) = sup sup We take the same strategy as in Section 3.1 and Proposition 1. That is we suppose that (X 0 ; P 0 ; K 0 ) is at or above the relevant triggers and we consider two limit cases, one in which the …rm has available only partial divestment and one in which the …rm can only divest all capital at once. Both cases are straightforward simpli…cations of the more general optimization problem (19). Denote by V m (x; p; k) the value function of the …rm following optimal partial divestment and by V e (x; p; k) the value function of the …rm following optimal …rm-sale policy. The value functions V (x; p; k), 2 fm; eg, must satisfy the following partial di¤erential equation (where we omit the function arguments for brevity): rV = 1 2 2 X x 2 V XX + 1 2 2 P p 2 V P P + X P xpV XP + X xV X + P pV P + xk :
Using that V (x; p; k) is homogeneous of degree one in x and p, we can simplify the The two ordinary di¤erential equations for = m and = e have known general analytical solutions and are solved for the optimal value and divestment policy by setting appropriate boundary conditions. In the case of = m, the optimal policy takes the form of barrier control at lower boundary Y m (k) in the space (y; k). We set the boundary conditions similar to conditions (4)- (6) ( 1) + ( X P ) + P r = 0:
In the case of = e, we have As in Proposition 1 we compare the values from the two limit policies, namely V m and V e . Straightforward calculations following the argument in Proposition 1 lead to the conclusion that there is a threshold level of a on a such that partial divestment is preferable over …rm sale if a < a , and if a a the …rm will optimally sell at once without partial divestment. It can be veri…ed that a = 1 1 1 (1 )
The derivative of a with respect to 1 is the same as the one analyzed in the proof of Proposition 4, and it was shown there that da =d 1 0. Di¤erentiating (21) we obtain that d 1 =d < 0. It follows that da =d 0, or in words, that with higher the …rm requires more premium to optimally choose …rm sale over partial divestment.
